A Traditional Catholic Moral Theologian’s Pastoral Advice on Avoiding Sin During Marital Foreplay

Overview

Monsignor Antonio Lanza’s teaching reassures couples that traditional Catholic moral theology allows affectionate and even moderately sexual expressions in marriage when they do not involve intentional orgasm outside intercourse. He explains that tender acts pose little moral risk, that more stimulating acts can be used with proportionate reasons or when spouses intend to complete the marital act, and that only actions which directly initiate intercourse require clear intent to consummate it. His framework shows that married love naturally includes varied expressions of closeness, and that moral discernment rests on intention and consent rather than fear.

The following passage is taken from esteemed moral theologian Monsignor Antonio Lanza (1905-1950). The purpose of sharing this is to provide as many resources as we can for those who may be scrupulous about whether the positions our articles have taken have a root in traditional Catholic moral theology. Rest assured, they do, and here is just one example among many, taken from Monsignor Lanza’s Theologiae Moralis. Appendix: De castitate et luxuria:

“The following sexual acts between married couples are categorized as follows: acts which slightly contribute to orgasm outside the marriage act, acts that seriously contribute to orgasm outside the marriage act, and acts that are so closely connected with orgasm outside the marriage act that they can be said to be its initiation.

Acts that slightly contribute to orgasm outside the marriage act are the signs of chaste love (kiss, embrace, tender words) and also more overtly sexual acts done in the moment, or which the experience of the spouses demonstrates to be ineffective in themselves, generally speaking (in ordinary circumstances), in giving rise to orgasm outside the marriage act.

These acts should never be omitted because of their potential risk of ensuing orgasm. Indeed, even if there is no reason proportionate to their potential for orgasm(which rarely ever happens), their distance from a potentially ensuing orgasm has made the positive precept of avoiding orgasm in such cases never grave. For orgasm, if it arises, will always be accidental in these cases, and will have to be attributed to some other non-voluntary cause.

Nevertheless, the danger of willful consent to the ensuing orgasm must always be absent; for the obligation to avoid the dangers of sin applies to everyone. But the distance of orgasm from such actions is not to be measured by the greater or lesser frequency with which it could occur. For even if, however often kisses are given, orgasm follows, the kiss will always of itself only slightly influence it, and its frequency will be the effect of the frequent confluence of many diverse kinds of causes. And therefore also in this case, the permission of orgasm, provided that the danger of consent to  its pleasure, is always truly absent, never reaches the point of mortal sin; indeed, if such acts are done for a proportionate reason, venial sin will often also be absent. Nor are spouses equally bound to perform the conjugal act because of imminent orgasm in these cases.

Acts which in themselves seriously contribute to orgasm (so that orgasm is truly probable) are overtly sexual acts, such as prolonged genital stimulation, unless it is clear either from the way in which they are performed or from their own experience that the spouses are not so effected by them that they pose no serious risk of orgasm. Nevertheless, when in common circumstances the causality of these acts is closely linked to the ensuing orgasm, it will be a grave offense for spouses to perform those acts without the intention of bringing such incomplete acts to their consummation in the marriage act, particularly if a grave cause or reason is lacking for positing such acts. On the other hand, it is permissible to perform those acts in those circumstances where, in the event of imminent orgasm, they can and will complete the conjugal act. Similarly, since the orgasm is caused by other concurrent causes in addition to these incomplete acts by themselves, a proportionately grave reason for engaging in these acts may be present, which can compensate for the spouses’ permission for orgasm.

Such causes are: the need to foster mutual love that may be waning; the suspicion of infidelity or an attraction towards another person which must be here and now averted; when the beginning of adulterous lust must be cut off; when the use of the marriage must be compensated for when the spouses cannot perform the marriage act, or, for a just cause, do not wish to increase the number of children; finally, when the request of the other spouse is made urgently, or is made in such a way that the refusal is hard to bear. Then either the request itself reveals a grave cause, or the inconveniences of the refusal creates such a cause.

In these cases, when the spouses notice that orgasm is imminent, however, they must cease from these acts or break them off. 

The graver the danger of orgasm, the graver the reason required for the acts to be performed elsewhere. However, you should take this without anxiety, without troublesome comparisons. It is enough that the things seem proportionate to the moral intuition.

Other acts are closely connected with orgasm, in which they immediately terminate. Such acts are, e.g., the genital-on-genital contact, beginning sexual intercourse, etc. Such acts are absolutely forbidden to spouses under grave circumstances, unless they occur in those circumstances where they can and wish to perform the marriage act.”